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ESSAY
ASKING JURORS To Do THE IMPOSSIBLE
Peter Tiersma*
I. Introduction
Being a juror has never been easy. Several hundred
years ago, English jurors were confined "without meat,
drink, fire, or candles" until they had finished their
deliberations.' If they failed to reach a verdict before the
judges left town (English judges would travel from the
royal courts at Westminster to various cities to try cases),
the jurors were supposed to be placed in a wagon and
"carted" to the judges' next destination.2
Today, the rigors of jury service are more prosaic.
Jurors are paid almost nothing in most jurisdictions, so
unless they work for the government or have an employer
who will pay them for not working, being on a jury can be
a substantial financial hardship. Arranging for childcare
and even finding a parking space near the courthouse are
further annoyances. Judges and court administrators have
worked hard to alleviate these burdens. 3 I would be an
ungrateful guest at this symposium if I failed to mention
that the courts of Tennessee have enacted a number of
* Professor of Law and Hon. William Matthew Byrne, Jr. Chair,
Loyola Law School.
I J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 88-89
(3rd ed. 1990).
2 Id.
3 See A.B.A. PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, http:/www.
abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2009) for some proposals to alleviate these problems. See also G.
Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79
JUDICATURE 216 (1996).
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significant jury reforms. 4 Nonetheless, for many citizens it
can still be quite burdensome to perform this important
civic duty.
Once a jury is empanelled, the difficulties continue
and may even worsen. Our legal system commonly asks
jurors to do things during trial and deliberations that are
either quite hard to do, or may actually be impossible. In
the rest of this article I will list some of the difficult or
impossible tasks that we expect jurors to perform.
I will end by proposing some solutions. Sometimes
all the legal system can do is honestly admit that it
sometimes expects jurors to do something that no human
being can accomplish. On other occasions, it may need to
break down a complex task into smaller parts, accompanied
by clear instructions in plain English. I anticipate that
some of the other speakers at this symposium will advance
other ideas.
II. Travel Back in Time
Jurors are routinely told that their job is to decide
"the facts," or "what actually happened," or simply "the
truth.",5  Sometimes the "facts" of a case relate to an
existing state of affairs. However, more commonly, the
jury has to decide what happened in the past. Typically,
the truth is a hotly disputed issue, and each party's
narrative may be at least partly accurate, making it
necessary for the jury to reconstruct the facts based on
incomplete or conflicting evidence. Even more difficult is
4 Neil P. Cohen & Daniel R. Cohen, Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U.
MEM. L. REv. 1 (2003). On the issue of the comprehensibility of jury
instructions, which is my main area of interest, the changes in
Tennessee have been more procedural (mostly involving timing and
providing written copies) than substantive. Id. at 49-59.
' See Judicial Council of California, Criminal Jury Instructions, No.
104; Revised Ariz. Jury Instructions (Crim.), No. 1 [hereinafter
Calcrim].
2
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to try to determine the contemporaneous mental state of
those who participated in the events.
The legal system therefore often expects jurors to
travel back in time and, once there, to ascertain exactly
what happened and the intentions of those who made it
happen. Doing so with complete confidence is impossible,
of course.
The law's answer to this problem is to redefine "the
truth" as that state of affairs that the jury finds is more
likely than not to be true, or clearly and convincingly true,
or true beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, the legal system uses legal
presumptions and the burden of proof to resolve factual
indeterminacies. If what actually happened is unclear, the
party who has been assigned the burden of proof will
probably lose its case.
Standards of evidence and burdens of proof are a
reasonable solution to the impossibility of traveling back in
time. Yet they are to some extent inconsistent with the
system's insistence that jurors must determine "the facts,"
"the truth," or "what really happened."
My impression is that jurors are sometimes
distressed by this rhetorical dissonance. It is not unusual
for them to return to court for additional instructions on the
burden of proof or on the meaning of reasonable doubt.
6
Most judges are afraid to try to explain it, and they are even
more reluctant to give the jury examples to illustrate the
concept. Some of the difficulties could be resolved by
using clearer language to explain the burden; many existing
instructions are quite convoluted and full of archaic
language. 7 Illustrations from cases that have been upheld
on appeal might also be helpful.
All the same, sometimes we should probably just
admit to jurors that they cannot really travel back in time.
6 See People v. Ruge, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
7 PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE, 194-95 (1999).
3
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 108
Absolute truth is unattainable, so they should just do the
best they can. It is not unusual for judges to admit as much
to juries that have deadlocked, as is the case in Illinois: "In
a large proportion of cases absolute certainty cannot be
expected nor does the law require it." 8 Why not say so
right at the beginning of every trial.
III. Divine the Future
We are not yet finished with time travel. The law
also expects jurors to be oracles or fortunetellers.
Obviously, traveling to the future is even more difficult
than transporting oneself to the past. It truly is impossible.
The issue occasionally arises in the criminal
context. In capital cases, for instance, jurors may
sometimes need to decide a defendant's future
dangerousness. The question arises more often in civil
trials, especially with respect to damages. For example,
juries may have to predict what type of employment a
badly injured teenager would have obtained once he grew
up and how much money he would have earned from the
time that he would have begun work until he would have
retired, absent the injury. Once it has made this
prediction, the jury typically needs to predict what the
interest rate or rate of inflation will be in future years so
they can properly reduce the amount to present value.'
0
Likewise, where a woman's husband is severely
injured and can no longer perform household tasks or
provide affection or engage in sexual relations in the future,
a jury may need to predict how many hours a week he
would have worked around the house, absent the injury,
8 11. Pattern Instructions, No. 1.06.
9 See Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F.Supp. 1187 (Dist. D.C. 1996). A
judge decided the Athridge case, but it could just as well have been a
jury.
10 See, e.g., Tenn. Pattern Jury Instructions, Civ, No. 14.54.
4
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 109
how much affection he would have provided, absent the
injury, and the quantity and quality of the sexual relations
that the couple would have had, absent the injury. Then it
must place a dollar figure on these activities. Most
jurisdictions further require that compensation for
household services also be reduced to present value, but not
the damages for lost affection and sexual relations.
In the Arizona Jury Project, which involved videotaping
around 50 civil trials (including deliberations), one of the
cases required calculating the plaintiffs probable life
expectancy, which was complicated because the plaintiff
was in poor health and greatly overweight before the injury.
One juror aptly commented: "we need a crystal ball." ' 1
Again, the burden or standard of proof can be
helpful, but at the same time it is bizarre to think that a jury
can decide that more likely than not a badly-injured
teenager would have become a brain surgeon at age 29
earning $150,000 per year until she retired at age 67. The
preponderance standard makes little sense in this context.
The jury might decide that this is the most likely outcome
in light of the evidence available to them, but it is not
accurate to say that this specific outcome is more likely
than all the other possible options.
The best approach, once again, is to be honest with
jurors and to admit that no one can predict the future. Tell
them that someone has to decide these difficult questions,
that they have been selected to be that "someone," and that
they should do the best they can based on the evidence that
they received.
IV. Ignore the Obvious
There is a popular expression that goes, "Don't
think of a pink elephant." Of course, the first thing that you
" Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on
Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857, 1873-74 (2001).
5
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will think of is a pink elephant. It is hard to ignore the
obvious. Efforts to suppress a thought tend only to make it
more salient.'
2
Jury instructions occasionally admonish jurors to
ignore the obvious. In just about every criminal case,
judges tell jurors that the fact that the defendant is on trial
is not evidence that he might have committed the crime.
This is a bedrock principle in the common-law system of
justice. Yet as a factual assertion, it is hard to justify. If it
is really true (as defense lawyers are wont to suggest) that it
is no more likely that the defendant committed the crime
than any randomly-selected person on the street, our
criminal justice system would long ago have collapsed. No
doubt, police and prosecutors are sometimes stupid,
corrupt, or politically-motivated, but as a factual matter the
defendant in a criminal case is much more likely to have
committed the crime in question than the average local
citizen.
There is research indicating that jurors do not
always comprehend traditional instructions on the burden
of proof and the presumption of innocence.13 Part of the
reason may be that, as noted above, these concepts
contradict ordinary logic. Whenever legal concepts are
counterintuitive, it is that much more important to convey
the information as clearly as possible. Understandable
statements of the presumption of innocence are therefore
critical.
In addition, as research by Shari Diamond and
Jonathan Casper suggests, an admonition is more likely to
12 See Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101
PSYCHOL. REv. 343 (1994).
13 Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches
Us about the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
589, 600 (1997).
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be effective if you explain the reason for it. 14  I would
therefore tell jurors that because the defendant is on trial, it
may seem logical that he is the most likely person to have
committed the crime in question. Nevertheless, I would
continue by pointing out that the police and prosecutors can
and do make mistakes, and that therefore the presumption
of innocence is an important legal principle that requires
the state to prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Similar issues arise when a criminal defendant is
physically restrained. California judges inform jurors that
they should not speculate on the reason for the restraints
and that they should not discuss it or consider it for any
purpose. 15 Yet it is very hard to ignore something that is
potentially so relevant. Logically, the defendant is
dangerous or he is a flight risk. Either conclusion is
relevant information, especially if he is accused of having
committed a crime of violence.
Instructing jurors to ignore a defendant's restraints
is clearly the right thing to do. Of course, it would be
better to avoid the situation entirely by devising a less
obvious way of controlling the defendant. Technologies
like "stun belts" (which deliver an electrical shock) may
sometimes be an acceptable option, although their use is
subject to accidents and possible abuse. 16 When a visible
restraint is the only option, judges may have no choice but
to tell jurors to ignore the obvious.
Judges also tell criminal jurors not to consider
punishment. 17  They are simply to decide guilt or
innocence. For the most part, this seems reasonable
14 Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury,
26 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 513, 534 (1992).
15 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 204.
16 People v. Mar, 52 P.3d 95, 97-98 (Cal. 2002).
17 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 200.
7
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enough. Yet what has changed the situation recently is the
passage of "three strikes" laws in some jurisdictions, which
require judges to impose draconian punishments for a third
offense. If that offense involved serious violence, most
people would probably not object to a long prison sentence.
Yet sometimes defendants have received very lengthy
sentences for minor third offenses.18  If prosecutors and
judges do not have the good sense to ensure that the
punishment fits the crime, we may need to rely on jurors to
do so.
V. Forget You Ever Heard This
Related to ignoring the obvious is the direction to
forget that you ever heard certain information. This creates
the conundrum of "unringing the bell." For example, a
judge may tell jurors that if she ordered testimony stricken
from the record, they should disregard that testimony and
proceed as though they had never heard it. 19 Trial lawyers
are keenly aware of how difficult it can be to ignore
potentially relevant evidence, so they sometimes make a
strategic decision not to object to such evidence in order to
avoid highlighting it.
Perhaps even more problematic is ordering jurors to
consider evidence only for a limited purpose. Consider
State Farm Insurance Company v. Campbell, one of a
series of Supreme Court decisions aimed at reining in
punitive damage awards. The Court held that under the
Due Process Clause, juries, when setting the amount of
punitive damages, should not be allowed to consider
evidence of a defendant's conduct outside the jurisdiction.
" See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & SAM KAMIN,
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA: PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY (2001).
19 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 104.
20 Id at 303, 345 (corpus delicti).
8
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Yet they can consider out-of-state conduct on the question
of whether the defendant's behavior in the case before them
was reprehensible (for instance, to prove that the
defendant's conduct was not an isolated incident).21
Prior conviction evidence presents similar difficulties.
It can generally be used only on the issue of credibility, not
guilt. Yet studies show that limiting instructions have
22limited effectiveness. As Shari Diamond and Neil
Vidmar have concluded, it is "psychologically challenging,
and probably impossible" to use a defendant's criminal
record on the issue of whether to believe the defendant's
testimony, but not to decide his guilt.
23
In fact, there are indications that a limiting
instruction can make the inadmissible evidence more
salient than when the evidence is admitted without such an
instruction.24  To the extent that these evidentiary
prohibitions are required by the Constitution, there is
probably no alternative. Judges will have to ask jurors to
engage in very difficult or perhaps even impossible mental
gymnastics.
What would make this task easier, in my opinion, is
for the judge to specify the evidence or statements to which
the instruction applies. 2 5 For example:
You have heard evidence that defendants A, B, and C
went to the gun store to buy a semi-automatic weapon. You
21 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422
(2003).
22 Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 162
(2007); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instruction: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to
Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43 (1985).
23 Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 11, at 1864.
24 M. Cox and S. Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instructions in Civil
Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules of Admissibility, 4 Soc.
BEHAV. 31 (1989).
25 See bench notes to Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 305.
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may consider this evidence only against defendants A and
B, not against C.
Clearly, limiting instructions are extremely
problematic, even if made as informative as possible. Have
you ever tried to forget something? It often seems that the
harder you try, the more deeply it is etched in your mind.
VI. Do Not Discuss This Case With Anyone
Jurors are routinely told that they should not discuss
the case, or any of the people involved in it, with anyone,
including their families.26 Of course, it is possible for
people not to talk about a particular subject. Spies and
government officials with security clearances are probably
accustomed to uttering "no comment" every time a friend
or family member asks how their day at work went.
However, this is extremely unnatural for ordinary people.
It must be very hard for someone to sit on a jury all day and
then return home for supper, refusing to tell her family
what happened.
This "silencing" rule applies to conversations with
other jurors as well. The instructions generally stipulate
that jurors should not discuss the case among themselves
until they begin their deliberations. 27 This is also strange.
During the length of the trial, the only people that jurors
can have a conversation with (during meals and breaks)
tend to be other jurors. About all they have in common is
their experience on the jury. It is only natural that they
would want to comment on what a witness said or what
they think of a particular lawyer.
It makes sense to tell jurors not to discuss the case
with outsiders, difficult as it may sometimes be, since
talking about the trial might lead to attempts to influence
their decision. The prohibition against discussing the case
26 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 10 1.
27 , ,
10
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with fellow jurors is harder to defend. A strong opponent
of the rule has been Judge Michael Dann of Arizona, who
argues that it reflects an outdated model of jurors as passive
recipients of information served to them by the lawyers and
witnesses, with jurors being expected to suspend all
judgment until the deliberations begin. As he points out, it
is highly unlikely that average human beings can process
information in this way.
2 8
The situation has slowly begun to change. The
recently-adopted ABA Standards Relating to Jury Trials
recommends giving civil jurors a limited right to discuss
the evidence during breaks in the trial proceedings, but only
if all jurors are present and they reserve judgment about the
outcome until they have formally deliberated.29 A few
jurisdictions, most notably Arizona, have begun
experimenting with allowing pre-deliberation discussions.
30
A noted group of jury researchers, including Shari
Diamond and Neil Vidmar, videotaped some of the trials as
well as the deliberations in one of these jurisdictions. They
concluded that when jurors were allowed to discuss the
evidence, they used the opportunity to fill in the gaps in
their knowledge, review testimony, and clarify
misunderstandings. The juries that were allowed to discuss
the evidence also showed a better understanding of expert
testimony. Although the study also identified some
28 B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights".
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1262-64
(1993).
29 A.B.A., supra note 3, at 13(F).
30 ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(f). For some other jurisdictions, see Shari
Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth
Murphy, Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3-4 and n. 7 (2003). For a discussion
of the Arizona jury innovations, see Janessa E. Shtabsky, Comment, A
More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the Standard for Reform With Its
New Jury Rules?, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 1009 (1996).
11
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potentially negative consequences, the researchers rendered
a generally positive verdict.
31
It is time to put an end to the unrealistic view of jurors
as passive recipients of carefully filtered information.
Letting them discuss the case before deliberations is one
way to do so.
VII. Base Your Decision Solely on the Evidence
Judges also typically tell jurors to base their
decision only on the evidence presented in court.32 They
prohibit jurors from doing any research, consulting a
dictionary, or using the internet or other reference
materials. They also tell jurors not to conduct experiments
or visit the scene. 33 It is an attempt to create a hermetically
sealed universe, in which access to information is strictly
controlled, and jurors-as noted above-are enjoined to do
nothing but sit back and listen. There are often good
reasons for restricting information in this way, but to some
extent, it conflicts with the basic duty of jurors to decide
the facts. Jurors may need to decide whether an
intersection of two streets is safe based on photos and
testimony of an engineer, rather than taking the most
logical course of action: driving through the intersection to
see for themselves if it seems safe.
Not only should jurors decline to do any research,
but also they are generally forbidden from considering any
3 Diamond et al., supra note 30, at 74-76. Similar conclusions were
reached by Valerie P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford, & G. Thomas
Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial
Discussions: The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (1999).
32 Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions, 54, 60
(2003).
33 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 101; Prosecuting Attorneys
Association of Michigan, Jury Instructions, http://www.paamtraffic
safety.com/www/jury-instructions_2.htm (last visited Mar. 29 2009).
12
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evidence they might accidentally encounter or discover. A
juror who stumbles upon such information may not share it
with other jurors.34  These rules are also very
counterintuitive. Although I have never been allowed to
serve on a jury (perhaps for obvious reasons), I am forced
to sit through the selection process every two or three
years. One morning, when I arrived in court for jury
selection, I made a stop at the bathroom and encountered
the defendant, who was accused of possessing a small
amount of heroin. His breath had a strong smell of alcohol
to it. Had it been a public intoxication or drunk driving
case, and had I been selected, could I really be expected to
ignore this "out-of-court" evidence?
The net effect of the "closed universe" of the
courtroom is to require jurors to decide what happened
based on what in some cases is incomplete information.
Either jurors must ignore relevant evidence, or they must
decide "the truth" knowing they do not have access to all of
the facts.
VIII. Forget Everything You Ever Learned
As we discussed in the previous section, jurors are
expected to operate in a closed universe with access only to
specified information. At the same time, they are expected
to bring certain knowledge and capabilities with them.
They need to speak and understand the English language,
and can be excluded if they do not. They are expected to
have and use their common sense, knowledge of the world,
and their experiences as members of our culture and
society. For instance, jurors are often expected to draw
inferences from the facts, but doing so invariably requires
knowledge about how the world works. Tracks in the snow
are evidence that a rabbit has passed over the snow only if
34 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 101; Ninth Circuit Criminal Manual of
Model Jury Instructions, supra note 34, at 60.
13
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jurors know that there are animals called rabbits, that they
can move themselves forward, and that they leave a certain
type of impression in the snow when doing so. Thus, the
Ohio instruction on circumstantial evidence explicitly
invokes the "common experience of mankind. 35
It is clearly acceptable and, indeed, desirable for
jurors to take certain pre-existing knowledge and
experience into the courtroom. Yet tensions can arise when
the notion of the jury as inhabiting a closed universe, with
strict rules of admissibility of evidence into that universe,
conflicts with the jurors' pre-existing knowledge. The law
then requires jurors to ignore certain aspects of their
knowledge and experience. This can be very hard-
perhaps impossible-for many people to do.
Although jurors must be able to speak English, they
are sometimes expected to temporarily forget the normal
meaning of certain words. Psychologist Vicki Smith has
examined this phenomenon. Almost every English speaker
is familiar with the term burglary, for instance. In common
usage, it means something like "breaking into a house or
perhaps other building and taking something with an intent
to steal." The legal meaning is quite different: to enter a
house or building without authorization while intending to
commit a felony inside.36 Legally, therefore, breaking into
a house with an intent to kill the occupant, but taking
nothing, would be a burglary.
Smith asked research subjects to list the features
that they associated with various crimes.37  The most
common feature associated with burglary (54%) was that
something of value was taken.38 This is consistent with the
35 Ohio Jury Instructions, No. 405.01 (2006).
36 Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations
of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 857-61
(1991).
17 Id. at 859.
" Id. at 861.
14
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ordinary meaning of the word burglary, but it is not a legal
element of the crime in most jurisdictions. Smith also
asked participants about assault. Around 90% of them
believed that an assault involved a physical attack, even
though this is-once again-not a legal requirement (it is
an element of the related crime of battery). 39 The two most
common features that her subjects listed for a kidnapping
were that there was a ransom demand (63%) and that the
victim was a child (60%).40 These are likewise not
elements of the crime, legally speaking. 41 Smith's results
and analysis are more complex than I have suggested, but
they clearly show that jurors have pre-existing knowledge
and concepts that differ from legal requirements.
Smith also found that jury instructions did not alter
the results significantly; the effects of pre-existing
knowledge persisted even after subjects were instructed on
the law.42 Her subjects continued to be heavily influenced
by the ordinary meaning of words like burglary, assault,
and kidnapping, even after hearing the instructions.43 This
raises the question: could instructions that are more
comprehensible do a better job in dislodging previous
knowledge?
Mathew Curtis and I have done some research on
this issue. We presented undergraduate students at the
University of Southern California with the state's old jury
instruction on circumstantial evidence, which is phrased in
traditional legalese. Other students received the revised
instruction, which had been drafted to state the law in




42 Id. at 866.
43 id.
15
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addition contained an example. 44  The circumstantial
evidence instruction is interesting because many people
seem to believe that such evidence is equivalent to weak
evidence. Legally speaking, it is evidence that is based
upon an inference, and it can be either weak or strong.
After they read either the old or new instruction, we
presented participants with factual scenarios that required
them to decide whether the evidence was direct or
circumstantial. It turns out that the ordinary meaning of the
phrase heavily influenced both groups of participants.4a
Those who received the old instructions in legalese had an
overall correct response rate that was very close to chance.
The participants who received the new instructions did
significantly better, but they still had substantial difficulty
distinguishing the two types of evidence. 46 Our results to
some extent confirmed Smith's conclusion. It is difficult to
overcome pre-existing knowledge. Yet instructions written
in plainer English are more effective than those in
traditional legalese.
The law not only expects jurors to forget the
ordinary meaning of words, but it sometimes demands that
they forget their native language entirely. To be exact,
when there is testimony by a witness or the defendant in a
foreign language, judges typically inform jurors that even if
they understand the original testimony, they must follow
the English translation provided by the interpreter. Judges
sometimes add that such a juror may not retranslate the
testimony or point out to other jurors that the interpretation
is wrong.
47
44 Peter Tiersma & Mathew Curtis, Testing the Comprehensibility of
Jury Instructions: California's Old and New Instructions on
Circumstantial Evidence, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 231 (2008).
41 Id. at 256.
46 Id.
47 See Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 121.
16
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Of course, if you understand Swahili, it is humanly
impossible to ignore what the witness is saying in Swahili
and to listen only to the English translation. It would also
be very frustrating to have the judge essentially issue a gag
order forbidding you from telling the other jurors that the
interpreter made a mistake. Imagine that you, as a speaker
of English, decide to retire in Spain and learn to speak
Spanish well enough to serve on a jury. If a witness
testified in English, would you be able to close your ears
and listen only to a bad translation of the testimony into
Spanish?
Of course, interpreters are generally qualified
professionals who tend to be very offended if someone
questions their translation. Yet they are not always well
qualified, and even excellent interpreters can make
mistakes under pressure. The best compromise may be to
tell jurors to follow the translation, but if they believe that
the interpreter made a mistake, to inform the bailiff or some
other court official.48
IX. Be a Lie Detector
Jurors are supposed to decide what happened, at
least when the facts are in dispute. To do so, they need to
determine the credibility of witnesses.49  Unfortunately,
human beings are not very good lie detectors.
50
Furthermore, mechanical lie detectors are not much
better.
51
Perhaps the reason that we leave the credibility of
witnesses up to the jury, even though it may be difficult or
48 See id.
49 See Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 105.
50 See ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF LYING AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (Wiley
2000).
5' The seminal case is Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
17
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impossible for them to determine who is telling the truth, is
that the collective judgment of twelve ordinary citizens is
probably as accurate as the decision of a single judge or a
machine. Some day there may be a reliable technological
solution, but for now a jury can sniff out the truth as well as
any of the alternatives currently available. The jury's
decision may not always be factually correct, but it is
legally correct by virtue of the mere fact that it was made
by a jury.
X. Follow My Instructions
Judges almost always tell jurors that they must
follow the instructions, even if they disagree with them.
52
In other words, the instructions are not just suggestions.
They constitute the law that governs the case. Until about a
hundred years ago, juries had a certain amount of power, or
at least some discretion, to decide what the law is. Today it
is well settled in almost all American jurisdictions that the
judge decides what the law is, and the jury determines the
facts. How nullification fits into this picture is hard to say
exactly. The general rule seems to be that the jury has the
power to nullify, but does not have the right to do so. The
prevailing view is also that the judge should not inform
them that they have this power.
53
Of course, if the jury has to follow the judge's
instructions, it must remember them. This is problematic if
they were only conveyed orally, especially if the legal
standards are fairly complex. Even if it receives a written
copy, a jury has to understand the instructions. A well-
known study by Robert and Veda Charrow involved
playing 14 pre-recorded civil jury instructions to people
who had been called for jury duty, but who did not serve.
They were then asked to paraphrase the instructions as best
52 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 200.
53 People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209 (Cal. 2001).
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they could. Roughly speaking, about one-third to one-half
of the information conveyed by the instructions made its
way into the paraphrases. 54 The rest, presumably, had been
forgotten or was not comprehended.
Obviously, jurors cannot follow instructions that
they cannot remember or did not understand. For this
reason, several experts have recommended that juries
should always receive a written copy. Whether to provide
written copies is usually left to the discretion of the trial
judge, and many prefer not to do so. Some judges are
actually prohibited from providing copies of the
instructions, most notably in the New York criminal courts.
Perhaps they fear that jurors will fixate too much on the
exact text, or that they will focus on one part of the text to
the exclusion of others. This is not an unreasonable
position. People tend to interpret written materials much
more literally than speech, and they tend to focus on exact
words, at least when the author seems to have taken great
care in formulating the words of a text.
55
American judges, whether individually or as part of
a jury instruction committee, spend a fair amount of time
drafting the precise text of jury instructions. Directions to
the jury are quintessentially written texts. It is therefore
problematic when they are delivered purely by word of
mouth. As compared to spoken language, writing is much
denser (more information is conveyed in fewer words),
there is less repetition, the language is more formal and
difficult to understand, and the syntax is more complex.
56
Written language is meant to be read, not heard. Readers
54 Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79
COLUMB. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
55 Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1187, 1274 (2007).
56 Peter Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory
Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001).
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can take as much time as they need to figure out what it
means.
When people listen to spoken language, on the other
hand, they have to process it immediately, because usually
more speech is on its way. As a result, they may not
understand or remember the exact details of what the
speaker said, especially if the message is complicated.
Hearers tend to remember only the gist of what was said,
not the exact words.
The message is that if judges want jurors to
remember and apply carefully formulated and complex
instructions, they need to give jurors an exact copy of the
text. On the other hand, if a judge wants the jury to decide
the case on relatively general or straightforward principles,
and the case is legally uncomplicated, delivering the
instructions orally should be fine. In an English case that I
once observed at the Old Bailey, the judge's instructions on
the law consisted of telling the jury that rape involved
sexual intercourse without the woman's consent, and that
the jury had to be "sure" of its verdict. The judge was not
reading from a written script, so there would have been no
written copy to give to jurors. Nor would there have been a
need to provide jurors with written instructions.
Accordingly, if a judge delivers only oral
instructions, she should keep it simple. The instructions
should truly be oral language. If the instructions are long
and complicated enough that the judge has to write them
out and read them, he or she should give a copy of those
written instructions to the jury. Because almost all
American judges these days read carefully drafted written
text to jurors, they should normally give the jury a copy of
that text.
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XI. Read My Mind
Just as the factual information given to jurors may
sometimes be incomplete, the same may apply to the
instructions. Critical information may sometimes be
missing, or the instructions may contain an ambiguity. If
the jury asks for clarification, the judge might provide it or
he might just re-read the original instructions.
57
One of my colleagues at Loyola Law School of Los
Angeles, Christopher May, served on a jury and afterward
wrote a short article about his experience. As expected, the
jurors had trouble correctly understanding some of the
instructions, although they certainly understood the gist of
the matter. What surprised him was that the problem was
not limited to comprehension of the meaning of words and
sentences. He found that jurors-even when they
understood the instruction-had little idea what to do with
the information. 58 Presumably, jurors know what the end
product of their deliberations should be, but how do they
get there? What should they do first? Then what should
they do?
I would assume that most judges give jurors a
general overview of what they can expect during the trial.59
Beyond some general admonitions, they tend to be quite
coy about how jurors should approach deliberations.
Consider homicide. In many cases, jurors must process
two or three options, such as first-degree and second-
degree murder or manslaughter. In California, at least,
judges refuse to give the jury any advice on where to start
or how to proceed, although our new instructions do
57 Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 223-24 (Autumn 1989).
58 Christopher N. May, What Do We Do Now?: Helping Juries Apply
the Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 869 (1995).
59 See Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 100.
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include a general summary of the how the different types of
homicide relate to each other.
Judges also hide the ball on some other issues,
sometimes because they fear that they will slant or bias the
matter in some way. A good example is the California
instruction on evaluating the credibility of eyewitness
identifications.60 The instruction starts with a long list of
basic principles, such as how well the witness knew the
defendant, how well she could see him, and so forth.
Almost all of these principles are relatively self-evident.
Still some potentially important information, which may be
less obvious, is missing. One of the last items on the list is
whether the witness and the defendant are of different
races. Research has shown that cross-racial identifications
are much more problematic than those within a race. 61 The
California Supreme Court has acknowledged the point.62 It
seems to me that this is one of the critical issues that the
instruction is meant to address. Yet all the instruction does
is hint at this conclusion, rather than state it directly. If
jurors want to know why it might matter that the witness
and the defendant are of different races, they need to guess,
or do some independent research (which is strictly
prohibited!).
Or they need to read the judge's mind.
XII. You Be the Judge
Sometimes judges ask juries to make legal
decisions. An example is a California instruction involving
assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer who is
lawfully performing his duties. It specifies that the officer
is not lawfully performing his duties if he is making an
60 Id. at No. 315.
61 Sherri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 934, 936 (1984).
62 People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 717-18 (Cal. 1984).
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unlawful arrest or using excessive force. 63  In order to
decide whether the officer was "lawfully" performing his
duties, jurors are referred to another instruction that
explains, in great detail, when an arrest or detention is
permissible and how much force the officer is allowed to
use in specific circumstances. 64 This, of course, requires
jurors to be informed of concepts like "probable cause" and
"exigent circumstances." Such issues can be hard enough
for judges to determine. It is asking many ordinary jurors
to understand and apply the rules of criminal procedure.
Surely, they must be thinking, "Doesn't the state pay the
judge to make these decisions?"
On other occasions, the law expects jurors to
understand and apply constitutional law. Thus, California's
stalking law contains a defense if the accused person was
engaged in constitutionally protected activities. Jurors may
therefore be called upon to decide whether specified
conduct, which would otherwise constitute stalking, is
protected by the Constitution.65 This is, once again, the
sort of decision that is normally made by judges, and even
they find it difficult to draw clear lines in this area.
Perhaps special interrogatories, which simply ask
jurors to decide whether certain facts are true or not, would
be a better solution. The court could then assess, based
upon those facts, whether the constitutional defense should
be available.
66
Jurors, like judges, may also need to understand the
intricacies of the law of evidence. California has an
instruction dealing with a non-expert witness giving an
"opinion" on some matter. Once they have figured out
63 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 860.
64 Id. at No. 2670.
65 Cal. Pen. Code, § 646.9(f) and (g) (2008); Id. at No. 1301.
66 This solution may not be practical in states, like California, which
are extremely reluctant to allow special interrogatories in criminal
cases. See People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1972).
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which part of the testimony was an "opinion," jurors can
give it "whatever weight they think appropriate,"
67
although they are not told what an "opinion" is in a legal
sense. The average person will probably understand it as
defined in the American Heritage Dictionary: "A belief or
conclusion held with confidence, but not substantiated by
positive knowledge or proof., 68 If that is what jurors think
an "opinion" is, they should give opinions no credence
whatsoever!
Judges could make life easier for jurors by
specifying which parts of the witness' testimony were
"opinion" from a legal perspective. They might tell jurors:
"The bartender at Pete's Place testified that the defendant
was drunk when he left the bar on the night in question.
The law refers to this as 'opinion testimony.' There are
special rules for evaluating opinion testimony...."
Another judicial function that jurors must
sometimes perform is statutory interpretation. Whenever
judges instruct jurors using legalistic language that it is
taken verbatim from a statute, they are inviting-perhaps
even requiring-jurors to engage in statutory interpretation.
For instance, a California law makes it illegal to possess an
incendiary device "in an arrangement or preparation,"
language imported verbatim into a criminal instruction. 69
What in the world is a device in an arrangement or
preparation? If the judge does not explain it, jurors will
have to figure it out on their own. In other words, they will
have to interpret statutory language, an activity that is
usually considered the exclusive domain of judges.
Occasionally, appellate courts have held that jurors
should not interpret statutes. In Godfrey v. Georgia, a jury
67 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 333.
68 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1233 (4th
ed. 2006).
69 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 1550, based on Cal. Pen. Code § 453
(2008).
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sentenced the defendant to death for a murder that was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim." 70 The Supreme Court overturned the
penalty because the judge did not explain what these terms
meant. 7 Notice that this phrase is quite ambiguous. Is it
enough if a murder is horrible, or does it also have to
involve torture? In other words, does the phrase "in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim" modify only "inhuman," or both
"horrible or inhuman," or does it in addition modify "vile"?
The judge did not interpret the statute for the jurors, leaving
them to their own devices. They could have decided that
the statute merely required that the crime be "horrible," an
adjective that could be applied to any intentional killing.
Likewise, a New Jersey court has held that "[a] court's
obligation to guide the jury includes the duty to clarify
statutory language . . . when clarification is essential to
ensure that the jury will fully understand and actually find
[the elements of the crime]. 72
Yet, as Lawrence Solan has pointed out, many
courts have approved instructions that mimic statutory
language, without any further explanation.73 Indeed, it
remains common practice for jury instructions to track
statutes verbatim, or almost verbatim. Much statutory
language is reasonably comprehensible, of course. When it
is not, jurors will have to place their own gloss on it.
70 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
71 Id.
72 State v. Alexander, 643 A.2d 996, 1000 (N.J. 1994).
73 Lawrence Solan, Jurors as Statutory Interpreters, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1281, 1307 (2003). See also Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning,
Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury
Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998);
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
877 (1999).
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Several academics, including Solan, give at least
cautious approval to having jurors interpret statutes,
arguing that it will allow the jury to acquit when "the
prosecution is more aggressive than the ordinary meaning
and the jury's sense of decency permit."
74
What many judges seem not to realize is that when
they give the jury instructions that are full of legalese, as
happens when they parrot the language of statutes or
judicial opinions, they invite the jury to interpret that
language as they think best. This is, as Solan and others
admit an invitation to engage in a type of nullification.
7 5
Personally, I have very conflicting views on giving jurors
this power. The notion that juries are champions of justice
and bastions against oppression is certainly an attractive
one. Yet the rule of law is also an extremely important
value, one that the power of nullification undermines.
This is not the time or place to debate nullification.
My point is simply that if we want jurors to follow the law,
we need to ensure that the jurors understand it. Otherwise,
judges will be delegating their power of statutory
interpretation to the jury. You can be the judge as to
whether that is a good idea.
XIII. You Be the Expert
In addition to sometimes having to perform the
functions of a judge, jurors may be called upon to be
experts in a number of disparate fields. They may have the
assistance of expert witnesses at times, but on other
occasions, the jury simply has to figure it out as best it can
(without doing any research, of course!).
74 Solan, supra note 75, at 1311.
75 See generally id
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A. Lexicography
The legal system expects jurors to have an immense
vocabulary. Jurors must function like lexicographers
(scholars who study the meaning of words and compile
dictionaries). Of course, they have no training in this very
specialized field. Moreover, lexicographers have a large
number of reference works at their disposal. Jurors, in
contrast, commit misconduct if they look up words in a
dictionary or conduct a search for it on the internet.
Perhaps the most troubling example is contained in
death penalty instructions. They often tell jurors to
compare "mitigating" to "aggravating evidence" in order to
decide whether a defendant should be sentenced to death or
life in prison. Yet "mitigate" is a relatively unusual word
outside the law, and even people familiar with it sometimes
confuse it with "militate." Nonetheless, several courts have
held that it is a word of ordinary meaning that does not
need to be defined.76 If that were true, why is it that in at
least ten published capital cases, six of them from
California, juries have asked the judge to explain the
meaning of this word?
77
"Aggravation" is indeed an ordinary word, but its
legal meaning differs dramatically from how ordinary
people generally use it. For the average person, to
"aggravate" is to annoy. Your neighbor's loud stereo
music can be very aggravating, but this is not a reason to
have him executed.
The list of examples of highly unusual or literate
vocabulary is long, so I will limit myself to a few additional
illustrations. Some criminal jury instructions use the word
76 Peter Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors
Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1, 13; Tiersma, supra
note 7, at 233-40.
77 Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death, supra, note 78, at 15-17.
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"importune," for instance. 78 If you are familiar with older
translations of the Bible, you may know what this word
means: "Do this now, my son, and deliver thyself, Seeing
thou art come into the hand of thy neighbor: Go, humble
thyself, and importune thy neighbor. . . ."79 Today, most
people would probably call the sheriff if they thought you
were importuning your neighbor.
A way to determine the rarity of "importune" is to
compare its frequency of occurrence with "beg," a close
synonym. Today, the internet is a convenient way to do so.
Using the search engine Google, and limiting ourselves to
English websites, we find the word "importune" occurring
just over 373,000 times.80 "Beg" occurs around 31 million
times.81 Of course, the internet is constantly changing and
the number of hits will probably increase over time. The
ratio of one word to the other is likely to remain roughly
the same, however. In this case, "beg" occurs around 83
times more often than "importune.
'" 82
A printed resource is The Educator's Word
Frequency Guide.8 3 It is based on a corpus of over 17
million words, containing over 150,000 word types (i.e.,
distinct words). The corpus consists of samples of text
from textbooks, literature, and popular works of fiction and
nonfiction. In this large corpus, the verb "beg" occurs 538
times, whereas "opportune" occurs 4 times. Thus, "beg" is
about 134 times as common as "importune."
8 4
78 Colo. Jury Instr., Criminal 7:35; 5 Conn. Prac., Criminal Jury
Instructions § 5.3 (4th ed.); 11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim.
WPIC 19.01 (3d ed.); NJ J.I. CRIM 2C: 1 1-3a(3).
79 Proverbs 6:3 (New American Standard Version).
80 Search conducted by author on Jan. 15, 2009.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 SUSAN M. ZENO ET AL., THE EDUCATOR'S WORD FREQUENCY GUIDE
(1995).
84 In each case, all variants of the word were counted (beg, begged,
etc.).
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There are many other rare words used in jury
instructions. A few examples follow. The number of
Google search results is in parentheses, followed by a slash
and then the number of occurrences in The Educator's
Word Frequency Guide):
captious (in the reasonable doubt instruction85)
(306,000/1)
extenuate (in death penalty instructions86)
(220,000/4)
inveigle (in kidnapping instructions) (141,000/3)
preponderate (used for civil burden of proof87)
(294,000/0)
Obviously, we should not be talking to jurors using
terminology that is so extremely rare in ordinary speech
and writing.
The words below are similar in meaning to those
above, and they give an impression of the number of





I was surprised by the relatively low frequency of
"entice," which I thought was a fairly normal word.
Although not nearly as rare as "captious" and
"preponderate," the low number of results on the internet is
fairly consistent with its relatively rare occurrence in the
corpus of The Educator's Word Frequency Guide. If
possible, it would make sense to use "persuade" instead, for
which Google reports over 17 million hits, and the word
85 The word "captious" was part of the Tennessee reasonable doubt
instruction, State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 522 (Tenn. 2004), but
has recently been deleted, Tenn. Pattern Instructions, Criminal 2:03.
86 Cal. Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 8.85.
87 Id., No. 2.50.2.
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frequency guide reports 543 occurrences.
8 8
Word frequency is only a rough indicator of how
likely it is that jurors will understand a word. Yet it can
provide some useful insights. Because the internet is
essentially a huge corpus, which is easily accessed by
means of search engines, it has become possible for almost
anyone to conduct a frequency count. You, too, can be an
amateur lexicographer! Of course, jurors are forbidden to
conduct this sort of research, or even to use a dictionary.
For that reason, the legal system should use words of
relatively high frequency, words that jurors can understand.
B. Etymology (and Historical Lexicography)
A jury may also need to have expertise in
etymology (the study of the origin of words) and historical
lexicography (the study of what words meant in the past) in
order to properly perform its task.
In California, it is illegal to manufacture an
incendiary device. 89 The word originally meant "to make
by hand," as indicated by the presence of the Latin root
manus "hand." 90  The modern meaning is "to make or
process goods, especially in large quantities and by means
of industrial machines." 91 It sounds very odd to say that
someone manufactured a cake or a basket or a birdhouse,
unless those objects are made in mass quantities by
machine. A modern juror might well think that the
defendant is only guilty of manufacturing incendiary
devices if he was mass-producing them.
88 Search, supra note 82.
89 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 1550.
90 Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modem
English (4th ed. 1966) 195-96 (etymology of "fact" at paragraph 3).
91 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1067
(4th ed. 2000) (definition of "manufacture").
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Statutes relating to forgery commonly use terminology
that jury instructions use in an archaic sense. Often they
define the crime as "uttering" or "publishing" a false or
counterfeited "instrument." 92 The word utter is related to
out, and it originally meant something like "to put out or
forth." Today it refers exclusively to sending out speech by
means of the vocal chords, except in instructions, where its
old significance still holds sway. Much the same is true of
publish, which originally meant "to make public," but
which in modern English is used mostly in the sense of
making public by printing. The meaning is currently being
extended to placing text and images on the internet, but the
older meaning of publish, which is the sense in which it is
used in forgery cases, is fairly archaic. It would sound very
odd if someone said that she "published" a poem by doing
a poetry reading or by giving a few handwritten copies to
some friends.
Some jury instructions use the word subscribe in an
outdated sense, to mean "sign." Originally, the word
referred to writing something (Latin scribere "write") at the
bottom of a document (Latin sub means "under"). Today it
refers primarily to ordering a periodical or pledging money
to a good cause. For the average person, a subscription is
no longer a signature, but a contract to pay for the receipt
of a periodical.
Finally, the phrase abandoned and malignant heart can
still be found occasionally in instructions for murder.
Malignant is sometimes still used in its original sense of
"evil" or "pernicious." When used in a medical sense (as
the word heart suggests), it usually means "cancerous."
The adjective abandoned seems to mean something like
"uninhibited" in its legal sense, but that sense has largely
been lost in modem usage. Not only are these adjectives
used in an archaic (or, at least, extremely unusual) sense,
92 Cal. Jury Instructions, Criminal, 15.01.
31
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 136
but the notion that emotions and intentions arise in the heart
is also highly anachronistic.
We should leave etymology and historical
lexicography to the real experts in this area.
C. Economics
Economics is another field in which juries may have
to master, both in criminal and civil cases. In tax cases,
jurors may be asked to decide whether the defendant had
unreported taxable income. They may need to apply the
net worth method, the bank deposits method, the cash
expenditures method, or the specific items method. 93 For
instance, under the bank deposits method, jurors must
decide that the defendant engaged in an activity that
produced taxable income, that the defendant regularly
deposited money in bank accounts, and that the money did
not come from nontaxable sources. Nontaxable sources
include gifts, inheritances, and loans. 94 Considering that
many people cannot even calculate their own taxes, it
seems a lot to demand that jurors calculate someone else's.
In the civil context, present value calculations
present another example of where jurors need to function as
economic experts. Typically, juries are required to reduce
certain economic damage awards (those intended to
compensate for a future expense) to present value. This
requires that juries predict what the inflation and the
interest rates will be in future years. That is impossible, of
course, even for Nobel-prize-winning economists.
Assuming jurors can make an educated guess
regarding interest rates and inflation, they still need to
know how to do the calculation. As illustrated by the
93 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 2842-45.
94 Id. at 2843.
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Tennessee instruction, judges typically explain the concept
in relatively abstract terms.
95
Present cash value" means the sum of money
needed now which, when added to what that sum may
reasonably be expected to earn in the future when invested,
would equal the amount of damages, expenses, or earnings
at the time in the future when the damages from the injury
will be suffered, or the expenses must be paid, or the
earnings would have been received. You should also
consider the impact of inflation, its impact on wages, and
its impact on purchasing power in determining the present
cash value of future damages.
96
It can help a great deal to provide an example or
illustration. Bethany Dumas suggests the following:
If you know that a person will need $1,000 five years
from now, you would normally not give him the $1,000
now, but if you were required to give him money now, you
would give him only the amount which, when invested,
would equal $1000 in five years. How much that money
should be now is for you to decide.
97
Special verdict forms might also be worth using. Such
forms might ask, "How much will the Mr. Akbar need for
future medical treatment?" The next question could ask
jurors to decide what the rate of inflation is likely to be in
the ensuing five years. The judge could then do the math,
but since judges are also not economists, they would
probably invoke the assistance of an accountant.
D. Other areas of expertise
There are several other areas in which jurors need to
make decisions that we would normally leave to experts.
95 Tenn. Pattern Instructions, Civil, No. 14.54 (8th ed. 2008).
96 Id.
97 Bethany K. Dumas, US Pattern Jury Instructions: Problems and
Proposals, 7 FORENSIC LlNGUISTICS 49, 61 (2000).
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Some instructions relating to sexual crimes, for instance,
require jurors to become specialists in human anatomy.
Jurors may need to become gun experts to deal with
weapons offenses or they may have to distinguish between
types of drugs if the case involves controlled substances.
Finally, they may need to be statisticians. Jurors presented
with DNA evidence may have to decide questions of
statistical probability, for instance. The available research
generally concludes that they do not comprehend such
issues very well.98
Given our legal system, there may be no way to
avoid having jurors act as experts from time to time. It is
usually not impossible for them to do so, but it can surely
be difficult. Juries obviously need some guidance from
comprehensible jury instructions and expert testimony. We
are making progress on the goal of producing more
understandable instructions. Now we just need to figure
out a way to persuade expert witnesses to explain their
fields of expertise more clearly.
XIV. Helping Jurors Do the Impossible
I have already mentioned some solutions to the
problem of asking jurors to do the impossible. I anticipate
that other participants in this symposium will elaborate on
these solutions or offer additional ideas. What follows is a
summary of some ways to ease the burden on jurors.
A. Find Someone Else to Do It
If it truly is impossible for jurors to do something,
an obvious solution is not to ask jurors to do it in the first
place. Of course, how judges interpret the scope of the
right to trial by jury will limit what can be done in this
respect. Logically, however, it seems silly to have juries be
98 Vidmar & Hans, supra note 22, at 182.
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the judge when a judge is available and qualified to make a
decision, such as whether an arrest or detention was legal.
Having juries comprised of experts in highly
technical areas may also make sense on occasion. If a case
involves tax fraud, a jury made up of accountants might not
be a bad idea, or we might have the case decided by an
ordinary jury, but ensure that two or three accountants are
also on the jury. Lawyers will probably object. They often
seem to strive to exclude from the jury anyone who knows
anything about the subject matter. Still, what could be
more sensible than having a few economists on a jury that
needs to decide a complicated case involving damages
resulting from price-fixing?
In reality, most American judges would be very
hesitant to allow specialized juries. Unlike English judges,
who can keep an overly complex case from the jury,
99
American judges sometimes have juries decide very
complicated issues. They apparently have a great deal of
confidence in the ability of jurors to understand the
evidence. Moreover, there is a real danger that specialized
juries will be biased toward one of the parties, or that they
are not representative of the community. What are called
"special juries" were once relatively common in the United
States, but because of concerns such as these they are rare
today. '
00
Thus, juries will have to decide some very
complicated factual issues, which require them to make
sense of expert testimony. The research on this issue, as
summarized by Vidmar and Hans, suggests that juries do
indeed find it hard to process highly technical evidence, but
that they do their best and for the most part do a credible
job. 10 Moreover, a study by Lynne Foster Lee and Irwin
Horowitz suggests that certain reforms, such as allowing
9' Id at 37.
100 Id. at 68-69.
101 Id. at 153-57.
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jurors to take notes and giving them some instructions
before the evidence is presented, helps jurors to make sense
of complicated information and to base their decisions upon
the evidence. 10 2 On the other hand, when the language in
which the information is presented is highly complex, even
pre-instructions and note taking do not suffice.1
0 3
What happens when jurors do not understand the
testimony of experts? Research by Joel Cooper and others
suggests that jurors shift to "peripheral processing."
10 4
They focus on factors like the experts' credentials and rate
of pay. 105 Thus, they tend to follow the conclusions of the
experts who have the best credentials and charge the most
money for their testimony. 1
06
Although it may sometimes be possible to have a
judge or jury of experts decide a specific issue or even an
entire complicated case, a jury of ordinary citizens is likely
to remain the standard. Because ordinary jurors are not
experts on the law, the legal system needs to ensure that it
is explained to them in a way that they can comprehend.
Since they cannot be experts in economics or medicine,
such testimony must be presented in an understandable
way. If that is not feasible, we should probably let the
experts decide the case.
B. Find an Alternative Solution
Some things are impossible not just for juries, but
for anyone. Predicting the future is the best example.
Because no one can know the future, it may make more
102 Lynne Foster Lee & Irwin Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-aid
Innovations on Juror Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86
JUDICATURE 184 (2003).
103 Id.at 188.





5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 141
sense to wait until the future becomes the present (as with
damages for future lost wages or medical costs). There is
already a trend towards allowing periodic payments or
some kind of trust fund or structured settlement approach,
where damages for lost future wages can be paid over time,
and the expenses of future medical treatments can be
distributed when they are incurred. It not only eliminates
the difficulty of estimating the amount of future economic
losses, but also the need to make a present value
calculation.
This solution will not work in all areas. Not only is
it impossible to predict how much pain someone will have
in the future, but it is impossible with any certainty to place
a dollar amount on the pain that someone is suffering right
now. In such cases, the law seems to be using jurors to
legitimize a calculation that no human being can really
make, but that must nonetheless be made. The resulting
decision is correct not because jurors can predict the future
or place an economic value on pain, but because a jury of
twelve citizens made it.
C. Explain Clearly What the Jurors are
Expected to Do
If the law expects jurors to perform difficult or
impossible tasks, it needs to tell them what to do in a way
that makes sense to them. I have a watch with a digital
display that tells me time, the day of the week and the date.
It has four buttons that change the display, start and stop a
stopwatch or countdown timer, place phone number into a
phonebook, access the phonebook, and so forth. The four
buttons have to be pressed in a particular order, and often
multiple times, to achieve any one of these goals.
Whenever the time changes, I need to adjust the clock.
Although embarrassed to admit it, I cannot figure out how
to do this without consulting the manual. Six months later,
37
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I have forgotten how to do it and again have to pull out the
instructions. The procedure is not intuitive, with the result
that it is virtually impossible for me to set the time on this
watch without assistance. Fortunately, the instructions are
reasonably clear, as long as I read them carefully and do
exactly what they tell me.
The moral is that what started out as an impossible
task may become completely doable by means of clear,
step-by-step instructions. This lesson applies to juries also.
What might be impossible for a jury to figure out on its
own may become entirely feasible if the jury receives
understandable directions. I have elsewhere laid out some
general principles for preparing comprehensible jury
instructions, 107 so the following is merely a short summary.
1. Speak plainly
The most obvious requirement for drafting
understandable instructions is to use ordinary language to
construct relatively short and straightforward sentences.
Jurors should not have to be lexicographers. Nor should
they have to be experts in syntax.
2. Speak concretely
A second basic principle is to make the instructions
as concrete as possible. Statutes are typically abstract
principles of law. Jurors will need to apply those principles
to the facts. The judge's instructions should help them so
do.
One way to be more concrete is to insert the names
of the parties whenever possible. Many current criminal
instructions track statutory language by referring to "a
107 Peter M. Tiersma, Communicating with Juries: How to Draft More
Understandable Jury Instructions (National Center for State Courts,
2006).
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person" (when they really mean the defendant) and
"another person" (when referring to the victim). They also
tend to speak in the present tense ("a person commits
murder. . . .") when the jury's task is to decide what
happened in the past. It would be more informative for the
judge to tell the jury that Jane Jones is guilty of murder if
she intentionally killed Sam Smith and did not act is self-
defense. Of course, the law of homicide is complicated,
but it should generally be possible to state legal principles
in concrete terms that make sense in the context of the
specific case that the jury must decide.
3. Be positive
Jury instructions tend to waddle in negativity.
Perhaps the best illustration is the short phrase, "innocent
misrecollection is not uncommon." If we count the
prefixes un- and mis- as negatives (as we should), this five-
word clause has no less than three negative elements.'
0 8
California's old reasonable doubt instruction is
another example. It began: "Reasonable doubt is defined as
follows: It is not a mere possible doubt. . . ."" 9 When the
instruction got around to defining what a reasonable doubt
is (as opposed to what it is not), it once again did so in the
negative: "It is that state of the case which.. .leaves the
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say
they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge."
' 10
Of course, tinkering with the reasonable doubt
instruction is fraught with peril.'11 In many jurisdictions
reforming it may require legislative action. Yet it seems to
me that all that need to be said is that jurors, after carefully
108 Tiersma, supra note 7, at 66.
109 Id. at 194-96.
110 Id.
1 See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 69 P.3d 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App._2003).
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considering all the evidence, must be "firmly convinced" of
the truth of the charge. 112 However the standard is defined,
it should be done as positively as possible.
4. Tell the jurors what to do
As mentioned, a judge should speak plainly,
concretely, and positively to the jury. Yet much of the law,
even if explained in the most understandable language,
remains conceptually very complex. The best way to
ensure that someone completes a complicated task is to
break it down into smaller and more manageable tasks,
along with step-by-step instructions that explain what to do
first and what to do next.
Consider the directions for a CD or DVD player.
Suppose that (as is often true), they merely explain what
the function of each button is: "button A turns the power
off and on; button B is used to play and pause the disk;
button C selects the output channel," and so forth.
Experienced users of such equipment will have no trouble
figuring it out, but many people would not know where to
start. It is far more effective to specify what you need to do
to accomplish a particular goal. For instance, to play a
DVD disk, you should
turn the player on by pressing the power button;
press the eject button to open the tray that holds the
DVD disk;
place a disk in the tray;
press the eject button again to close the tray; and
push the "play" button to start viewing your DVD.
And, of course, an illustration of the device that points
out the location of each button would also be very useful.
In the case of jury instructions, judges should not
just read a list of abstract legal principles. They also need
112 For a case requiring such language, see State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d
970 (Ariz. 1995).
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to tell jurors what to do with the information. Thus, a judge
might advise jurors that they first must decide whether the
defendant committed murder. To do that, they need to
consider the elements for murder and determine whether
each of those elements is true beyond a reasonable doubt.
If so, they need to decide the degree of murder. If not, they
should proceed to the manslaughter instruction and repeat
the process.
An even better way to accomplish this goal is by
means of verdict forms. The committee that created
California's new civil instructions crafted an extensive
series of such forms. Their use in criminal cases is likely to
be more controversial, but when available they can greatly
simplify the jury's task. Imagine being given a copy of the
Internal Revenue Code and directed to use it to compute
your tax. This would be impossible for just about anyone.
Yet quite a few people can determine how much tax they
owe using Form 1040, filling in the blanks, and making
some simple computations.
5. Explain why you are asking jurors to
do something
If a judge is asking jurors to ignore the obvious or
forget about something, they are more likely to comply if
they believe that there is a good reason for the judge's
request. Rather than simply commanding jurors not to
draw an inference from the fact that the defendant in a
criminal case did not testify, the instructions will be more
effective if they explain that the right to remain silent is an
important constitutional principle, that its purpose is to
protect people from coercion, and that for this reason the
defendant can choose not to take the stand. Furthermore, if
the defendant decided not to testify, the jurors should
respect this decision by not assuming that this choice is
evidence that he committed the crime.
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6. Use illustrations and examples
Any competent teacher realizes how important it is
to include pertinent examples and illustrations. Not only do
they help students understand the material, but they also
serve to make the course less dull. In law school classes,
we use not only actual cases but also many hypothetical
scenarios.
Although there are some exceptions, 113 judges tend
to be very leery of examples or illustrations. It is certainly
wise to be cautious in this regard, because a badly-chosen
example may do more harm than good. Nonetheless, they
can be quite effective in illuminating difficult concepts. If
a jury is to have any hope of distinguishing direct from
circumstantial evidence, or reducing damage awards to
present value, an example is almost certainly essential.
7. Answer the jury's questions
Finally, why not let jurors-after they have received
their instructions or before they begin deliberations-ask
the judge any questions they might have about the law
governing the case or the procedures they should follow in
reaching a verdict? Of course, they can ask questions
during their deliberations, but the process is usually quite
cumbersome. Typically, the presiding juror or foreman
must write the question on a piece of paper and give it to
the bailiff, who in turn hands it to the judge. The parties
and attorneys are then summoned back to court and
allowed to argue how the question should be answered.
Then the jurors return to court to receive an answer.
It would be much easier to invite the jurors to ask
questions in open court before they leave to deliberate.
Admittedly, this is a fairly radical suggestion. Yet consider
once again the classroom. At medieval universities,
13 See Ninth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions, 1.05, comment.
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professors would read from a book or from their notes to
their students (this is what "lecture" meant originally). The
students, who could probably not afford to buy many
books, would write down what the professor said. That
was it. Questions were not encouraged. It sounds a lot like
modem jury instructions, doesn't it?
114
It is very rare to find a teacher today who does not
allow students to pose questions. Not only do questions
give teachers an opportunity to clarify the material, but they
also provide important feedback on how well the students
understood it. Maybe the time has come to bring the
instruction of juries out the dark ages.
Any questions?
114 ROBERT S. RAIT, LIFE IN THE MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY 44-45 (1918).
43
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 148
44
